AI & TechnologyLovable App Rescue: 7 Problems to Fix Before Launch

Problems with real Lovable apps often show up in the same few places: database access rules, keys in the browser, server functions that don't check the caller, and the gap between the preview and the live app. A Lovable app is a React front end that talks to a Supabase database, either Lovable Cloud (which Lovable says uses "Supabase's open-source foundation") or a Supabase project you connect. The browser calls the database directly with a public key, so the database rules are what keep one user's data away from another.

Below are the seven problems to check before launch, how to test each one in a few minutes, and how to fix it. The facts below come from Lovable's and Supabase's own documentation and from the public security report on Lovable apps, and I re-read each source on October 20, 2026. The how-to-check and how-to-fix steps are my own advice.

1. Tables anyone can read or change

Lovable's Supabase guide is blunt: "Missing RLS policies are the most common way app data gets exposed." A table in the public schema with row-level security (RLS) turned off, or with a policy like USING (true), can be read, and often changed, by anyone who has your app's public key. That key ships in your site's JavaScript by design.

This is not a hypothetical. CVE-2025-48757 describes "an insufficient database Row-Level Security policy in Lovable through 2025-04-15" that, per the CVE text, allows unauthenticated attackers to read or write tables of generated sites. The entry is marked as disputed by Lovable, because each customer is responsible for protecting their own app's data. The researchers who filed it report that their own March 2025 scan, which predates Lovable's current Quick and Deep scans, found 303 endpoints across 170 projects, about 10.3% of the 1,645 they analyzed, with inadequate RLS settings.

How to check: open Supabase's Security Advisor and look for "RLS disabled in public" and "policy exists, RLS disabled". Then request each table with only the public key and no login. The free scan at the end of this page does that for you.

How to fix: turn on RLS for every table in the public schema and write policies that tie rows to auth.uid(). Remove any policy that lets everyone in.

2. A green scan with the wrong policies

Lovable's Quick scan "runs automatically every time you publish" and checks things like tables without RLS. A table can have a policy and still let the wrong people in. The CVE researchers said in 2025 that the scanner they tested only checked that a policy existed, "not its correctness". Lovable's current Quick scan reviews database access rules, for example tables without per-record access control, but it is still a fixed set of checks. Lovable itself says its tools "cannot guarantee complete security".

How to check: Lovable's own best-practice guide says to "sign in as a second user and confirm you cannot see or change the first user's data." Do that for every screen that shows private data, and repeat it for each role your app has.

How to fix: rewrite any policy that fails the two-user test, then test reads, inserts, updates and deletes separately. A policy that blocks reads can still allow writes.

3. Secret keys in the browser

Lovable's security docs explain that it "generates frontend code that runs in the browser, which means API keys and other secrets cannot be stored safely in client-side code." Supabase says the same about its secret and service_role keys: never put one in a browser, a shipped app or source control. Stripe secret keys, AI provider keys and admin keys belong in the same category.

How to check: search your GitHub repository and the built JavaScript for service_role, sb_secret_, sk_live and your providers' key prefixes.

How to fix: rotate any secret that was ever exposed, then move the call into a server function that reads the key from Lovable's Secrets. Only the publishable or anon key belongs in the browser.

4. Server functions that don't check who is calling

Payments, emails, AI calls and admin actions usually run in Supabase Edge Functions that Lovable writes for you. A function that uses the service key skips RLS entirely, so it has to check the caller itself. Supabase's default is verify_jwt = true, so "the platform validates the JWT before your handler runs", and it warns against turning that off just to clear an error.

How to check: call each function with no token, then with a normal user's token for an action only an admin should take. Look for verify_jwt = false in supabase/config.toml. Lovable's Deep scan reviews this kind of access control in your code, but "the Deep scan does not run automatically", so run it yourself.

How to fix: keep JWT verification on for anything a user triggers, check the user's role and ownership inside the function, and verify webhook signatures for calls from Stripe or other services.

5. Views and storage that skip your rules

Locking down a table is not enough if a view or a storage bucket exposes the same data. Supabase's advisor warns that a security definer view "runs with elevated privileges and ignores Row-Level Security". Files in a public storage bucket can be opened by anyone with the link.

How to check: in the Security Advisor, look for "security definer view" and "auth users exposed". In Storage, list which buckets are public.

How to fix: recreate views with security_invoker = on, copy the user fields you need into a profiles table instead of exposing auth.users, and make buckets with private files private, with storage policies.

6. The Supabase October 30, 2026 change

Supabase has made "no automatic grants" the default for new projects since May 30, 2026, and applies it to all existing projects on October 30, 2026. Once it applies to your project, a new table in the public schema fails with "permission denied for table" until a migration grants it. Supabase also says "existing tables are not affected", so a table that is open today stays open.

If your Lovable app uses a Supabase project you own, the change applies. Lovable's docs don't say whether Lovable Cloud follows the same default or adds grants to the migrations it writes, so after October 30, create a test table and check it from the app.

How to check: paste your migrations into the free Supabase October 30 grants checker. The full guide to the change has the exact grant lines.

How to fix: add a grant per role in the same migration that creates each table, next to RLS and its policies.

7. No safe path between the preview and production

Three facts from Lovable's docs catch teams out once real users arrive:

• Reverting doesn't undo data changes. Lovable's guide says "reverting restores your code, not your database data". A bad migration or a test that wrote to the live database stays in the database.
• The live site is a snapshot. It only changes when you publish again, so the preview and the live app can drift apart.
• GitHub sync has limits. "Lovable only edits and syncs one branch at a time", and "Git sync always creates a new repository", so you can't attach a project to an existing repository. Two people, or Lovable and a local editor, pushing to the same branch can overwrite each other's work.

Moving off Lovable Cloud is possible but manual, and removing Cloud "permanently deletes your Cloud instance and cannot be undone", so export your database and files first.

How to fix: export and test a database backup before launch, keep schema changes in migrations in the repository, agree who pushes to the synced branch, and run payments in test mode until the two-user test passes.

What to do this week

1. Run the free leak scan below against your live site.
2. Do the two-user test on every page with private data.
3. Search your repository for secret keys and rotate anything you find.
4. Run Lovable's Deep scan and read every finding.
5. Check your newest migrations for grants before October 30.

Need a hand?

If you'd rather have someone else check it, the AI-Built App Rescue starts with a $450 Launch Check. You send read-only access, and within 3 business days you get each problem ranked by severity, with where it is and how it was confirmed, plus a fixed price for the Rescue Sprint. The $450 is credited if you go ahead, and you keep the code either way. Built with something else? See the Bolt, Replit and Cursor checklists. Or send me a short description.